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Abstract: We investigate why two person teams beat the truth wins benchmark in signaling games 
(Cooper and Kagel, 2005 & 2009) by studying an advice treatment where advisees have the benefit 
of two individuals’ insight but not bilateral communication.  The TW benchmark states that the 
performance of a team for problems with a demonstrable correct solution should be no worse than 
the performance of its most able individual.  If one individual solves the problem, the team solves 
it as well.  Advisees whose advisors who play strategically have significantly higher levels of 
strategic play, but fall well short of the truth wins benchmark as (i) many advisors who play 
strategically do not provide advice to this effect, and (ii) many advisees fail to follow sound advice.  
Effect (i) is largely attributable to female advisors who are far less likely to provide advice than 
men. Whether or not advice contains a clear explanation for its effectiveness has no effect on the 
likelihood of advisees’ strategic play, a result at odds with the idea that economic agents regularly 
consider all the available alternatives. 
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A number of papers have studied how play of games by teams differs from play by 
individuals and it is well-established that teams are more strategic than individuals.1  In earlier 
papers (Cooper and Kagel, 2005 and 2009) we too report that two person teams in a signaling 
game have substantially higher levels of strategic play than individuals  playing the same game. 
More importantly, we find that the level of strategic play by teams consistently meets and/or 
beats a demanding “truth wins” (TW) benchmark (Lorge and Solomon, 1955).  The TW 
benchmark states that the performance of a team for problems with a demonstrable correct 
solution should be no worse than the performance of its most able individual.  If one individual 
solves the problem, the team solves it as well.  Our finding that teams beat this benchmark is 
surprising since the relevant psychology literature indicates that, while teams typically 
outperform individuals, it is rare for teams to meet or beat the TW benchmark (Davis, 1992).  
The research reported below presents data from new experiments where subjects play the 
signaling game from our preceding papers in advisor-advisee pairings.  Although the TW 
benchmark is equally valid for advisees as teams, advisees consistently fail to reach this mark.  
The mechanism underlying this failure helps explain why two person teams beat the TW 
benchmark in these signaling games.  Our results also provide a better understanding of advisor-
advisee relationships in strategic environments.      
To explore our findings in more detail, we start by explaining the simple model underlying 
the TW benchmark.  There are two distinct branches of the psychology literature on common 
purpose groups solving problems, one dealing with judgmental questions and another, more 
relevant for our purposes, dealing with “eureka” problems.  Eureka problems require no special 
expertise or knowledge to solve, but have a demonstrably correct solution that, while not 
immediately obvious, can be easily confirmed once discovered.  Logic problems like the classic 
Tower of Hanoi puzzle are good examples of eureka problems, and we argue below that strategic 
play in the signaling game we study also fits well in this category.2  Consider a team tasked with 
solving a eureka problem.  Suppose it is organized in a way that involves minimal interaction 
between teammates: team members independently attempt to solve the problem and then 
                                                            
1 See Charness and Sutter (2012) and Kugler, Kausel, and Kocher (2012) for recent reviews of the literature. 
2 Many commonly studied games (i.e. the beauty contest game, the ultimatum game, coordination games) lack a 
demonstrably correct course of action and therefore cannot be described as eureka problems.  The existing 
economics literature on team play of games largely studies such games and therefore does not speak to the issue of 
whether teams meet or exceed the TW benchmark.  
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compare solutions.  As long as the team always recognizes and adopts a correct solution by one 
of its members (i.e. the truth wins), the probability that the group solves the problem equals the 
probability that at least one group member solves the problem.  Comparing the performance of 
freely interacting teams with the resulting truth wins (TW) benchmark makes it possible to 
identify the presence of positive, negative, or zero synergies.  In other words, exceeding the TW 
benchmark implies that working together in a freely interaction team makes subjects better at 
learning strategic play in the signaling game than they would be working alone.  
Our experiments replicate the result that teams beat the TW benchmark and implement two 
new treatments exploring why.  The first is a “self-advice” treatment where subjects play as 
individuals but were encouraged to type out their thoughts about the game.  A central feature of 
playing in a team is proposing (and possibly explaining) a course of action to your teammate.  
We hypothesized that the act of writing down their thoughts about the game might stimulate 
subjects to reason more deeply, leading to the superior performance of teams.  If so, self-advice 
should also lead to more strategic play.  The data did not support this conjecture as individuals 
with and without “self-advice” had essentially the same level of strategic play throughout.   
Our second treatment, which is the primary focus of the analysis reported on here, replaces 
freely interacting teams with advisor-advisee pairings.  Advisors and advisees are in fixed 
pairings and, like teammates, play identical games (i.e. same role and, when relevant, same 
type).  Each member of the pair makes their own decisions and receives the full payoff from their 
game.  Advisors also receive a bonus payment based on their advisees’ payoffs as an incentive to 
provide useful advice.  Rather than the bilateral communication available to teams, the 
discussions of advisor-advisee pairings are limited to one-way communication from advisors to 
advisees.  This permits us to determine whether having the insights of two individuals, which 
advisees have, increases strategic play sufficiently to meet or beat the TW benchmark.  Advisees 
play strategically more often than individuals, in line with the idea that two heads are better than 
one, but consistently fail to meet a modified version of the TW benchmark, suggesting that 
bilateral communication is an essential element of teams’ success.   
To understand why advisees fall below the TW benchmark, consider the two-step process of 
giving and receiving advice that underlies the natural extension of the TW model to advisor-
advisee pairings.  (1) Advisors who play strategically should provide advice to this effect given 
their strong incentives to help their advisees.  (2) Advisees should follow advice to play 
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strategically since they know advisors have incentives to provide useful advice and it is easily 
confirmed that strategic play is the optimal course of action.3  In reality, failures occur for both 
steps of the advice process.  For inexperienced sessions, almost half (43%) of advisors who have 
a history of playing strategically fail to advise their partners to play strategically.  This cannot be 
attributed to a general unwillingness to give advice, as most inexperienced advisors (85%) send 
messages that include advice about playing the game.4 Nor can it be attributed to inexperienced 
subjects who have just considered playing strategically for the first time: 41% of inexperienced 
advisors who play strategically during the first half of their session never advise their partners to 
do so.  The transmission of advice is little improved in experienced subject sessions.  While 
almost all advisors (89%) play strategically in their experienced subject session, and most play 
strategically relatively early (86% in the first half of the session), 42% of experienced advisors 
never advise their partner to do so.  Turning to advisees, a third (34%) of inexperienced advisees 
who have received advice to play strategically fail to follow it.  In short, the TW model assumes 
that advice acts like a well-made pipe, conveying an advisor’s insights to the advisee without any 
loss, and with advisees acting on this advice.  But our data shows that for advisor-advisee 
pairings this pipe is quite leaky.  
In contrast, communication between teammates is both “denser” than between advisors and 
advisees and less prone to leaks.  For inexperienced teams relevant advice was exchanged in 
70% of all periods compared to 22% in the advisor-advisee treatment. Further, it is rare that the 
“truth loses” with teams talking themselves out of strategic play.5  There are a number of  
conversations between teammates demonstrating that two way communication is necessary to 
clarify the correctness of the strategic insight passed from one teammate to another.  
A key factor behind the failure of advisors who have played strategically to provide salient 
advice is that women are much less likely to advise strategic play than men, even after 
controlling for their level of strategic play.  The difference is especially striking if we consider 
the case where advice is most critical, among inexperienced advisors who have played 
strategically: Seventy three percent (73%) of inexperienced male advisors who have played 
                                                            
3 In addition, it is assumed that advisees who are not provided with advice are able to figure out and act strategically 
at the same rate as players acting on their own.  This part of the modified TW model is satisfied in the data; i.e., 
advisees don’t stop thinking on their own waiting for insights from their advisors.  
4 Another 8% sent messages that did not consist of advice in an obvious way, and 7% did not send messages. 
5 This occurs 1% of the time. 
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strategically also give advice to play strategically, compared to only 31% of female advisors.  To 
our knowledge, a gender effect of this sort has not previously been reported in the literature on 
advice. 
With respect to whether advisees follow advice to play strategically, the marginal effect of a 
sound explanation of why the advice should be followed is essentially zero.   Game theorists take 
it for granted that all available actions will be considered in determining what choices to make, 
but in a relatively complex game such as ours this assumption is likely to be too strong.  In the 
spirit of rational inattention, individuals playing the game may only consider a small set of 
seemingly plausible actions (Mussweller et al., 2000; Lord et al., 1984). In this case advice can 
serve the important role of changing the set of actions under consideration, getting agents to 
consider the hitherto unrecognized benefits of these alternative actions.  This is a surprising 
result from the standpoint of mainstream economic theory. 
Most of the economics literature on advice has focused on how advice can improve 
performance rather than why it can fail, but there nonetheless exists a large amount of related 
work in psychology as well as some in economics.  Under-responsiveness to advice is commonly 
observed in the psychology literature where it is referred to as “egocentric advice discounting” 
(see Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006, for a survey of the psychology literature). However, this 
literature studies non-strategic environments; e.g., a typical experiment might ask subjects about 
the dates of various historical events and then provide them with information about other 
individuals’ answers.  Low responsiveness to advice has also been reported in interactive settings 
such as ours in the small economics literature on advice.  For example, Schotter and Sopher 
(2003) study a battle of the sexes game.  While they report a surprisingly strong tendency to 
follow advice, even when it conflicts with the best response to the recipient’s beliefs, there 
remain a substantial minority of subjects who do not follow the advice.6  What has not been 
reported in the previous literature is the systematic failure of advisors who themselves have 
learned to play strategically to offer advice to this effect.  We have not seen anything to this 
effect in the psychology literature.  In the economics literature, the closest result  
 comes from Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher (2006) who study an individual choice problem, 
framed as a tournament, with inter-generational advice.  About a third of advisors fail to make 
any specific recommendation to their advisees.  Chaudhuri et al do not report how well these 
                                                            
6 In their baseline treatment, 30% of advisees do not follow advice.  
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advisors performed relative to those who did provide relevant advice, but it seems a safe guess 
that a number of advisors who chose numbers close to the optimum offered no relevant advice.7  
In the refereeing process, it was correctly pointed out that the Advice treatment differs from 
the 2x2 treatment along two dimensions (beyond eliminating bilateral communication) which 
could affect performance: (1) advisors do not receive the full payoff from their partner’s choice 
and (2) advisors play the game independently from their advisee as well as providing advice.  
The latter design element plays a central role in generating the main results in our paper, as we 
would not easily have detected advisors’ failures to pass along insights if they had not been 
playing as well as advising.  Nonetheless, it is possible that advisors with a greater stake in their 
advisee’s choice and no distractions due to making their own choice would provide more 
effective advice, leading to more strategic play by advisees.   
We address this possibility by running an “Alternative Advice” treatment where only 
advisees make decisions, the advisor’s sole role is to send messages to the advisee, and the 
advisor and advisee receive identical payoffs.  This led to significantly lower levels of strategic 
play by advisees than in the original advice treatment, as the frequency of advice to play 
strategically was much lower than in the original advice treatment.  The new advice treatment 
reinforces our conclusion that bilateral communication is necessary for the strong performance of 
teams in the limit pricing game. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section I introduces the signaling game which 
corresponds to a simplified version of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) limit pricing game. Sections 
II and III summarize the experimental design and procedures.  Section IV specifies the main 
research hypotheses.  Section V reports the experimental results both in terms of subjects’ 
behavior in the limit pricing game as well as comparing the content of the dialogues between 
advisors and advisees and teams. Section VI reports results from the follow-up advice treatment. 
Section VII summarizes the main results and their potential broader implications.  
I.  The Limit Pricing Game:  The experiment employs a stylized version of Milgrom and 
Roberts' (1982) entry limit pricing game that focuses on the signaling aspects of the game. An 
incumbent monopolist (M) faces a potential entrant (E).  The game proceeds as follows: (1) M 
observes its type, high cost (MH) or low cost (ML). It is common knowledge that there are 50% 
                                                            
7  Chaudhuri et al focus on the relationship between receiving advice and advisees’ performance, but note in the 
conclusion that the impact of advice relies on the ability of advisors to communicate their knowledge. 
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MLs and 50% MHs. (2) M chooses an output (monopolist actions 1 – 7) whose payoff is 
contingent on E’s response. (3) E sees this output, but not M’s type, and either enters (IN) or 
stays out (OUT).8  Payoffs in experimental currency units are reported in Tables 1a and b. 
[Insert Table 1a and b here] 
Three features of M’s payoffs are worth noting: (1) All else being equal, Ms are always 
better off if E chooses OUT rather than IN.  (2) MLs have a natural tendency to choose higher 
outputs than MHs.  In particular, suppose Ms are myopic, failing to recognize the relationship 
between their choice and Es likely response.  A myopic M will choose 2 as an MH and 4 as an 
ML.  We refer to these choices, highlighted in Table 1a, as the myopic maxima.  (3) Play of 6 and 
7 by MHs (also highlighted Table 1a) are strictly dominated strategies.  As such, an ML can 
perfectly distinguish its type by choosing 6 or 7.  
It is always profitable for Es to choose IN versus an MH and OUT versus an ML.  Without 
any information about the M’s type beyond the 50-50 prior distribution, it is more profitable for 
Es to choose IN as shown in the final column (shaded blue).   
 The asymmetric information, in conjunction with the fact that it is profitable to enter against 
MHs but not against MLs, provides an incentive for strategic play (limit pricing).  The game has 
two pure strategy separating (sequential) equilibria.  In both equilibria MHs play 2 with 
certainty.  MLs play 6 in the efficient equilibrium and 7 in the inefficient equilibrium.  In both 
equilibria Es enter against all outputs that are less than MLs’ equilibrium choice. This is 
supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs that any output less than 6 in the efficient equilibrium, or 
less than 7 in the inefficient equilibrium, represents an MH with sufficiently high probability to 
induce entry.  Past research shows that play typically converges, albeit slowly, to the efficient 
separating equilibrium (Cooper and Kagel, 2005).9   
Rather than focusing on equilibrium, our data analysis centers on whether MLs play 
“strategically.”  Strategic play is defined as ML’s choice of 5, 6 or 7.  While not the only possible 
definition of strategic play, this is a natural one since these choices are all part of equilibria in 
which MLs attempt to distinguish themselves from MHs, thereby preventing entry. 
                                                            
8 We collapse stage 2 of the original Milgrom and Roberts game into the payoffs in Table 1a.  This greatly simplifies 
the experimental design, focusing attention on the signaling aspects of the game.   
9 There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium, with MLs choosing 5 while MHs mix between 2 and 5, which has some 
drawing power in the data. 
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Strategic play by MLs fits well with the description of a “eureka” type problem; a problem 
with a non-obvious but demonstrably correct solution.  Playing strategically increases expected 
payoffs for MLs in all cycles of play for all four treatments.  The underlying insight is simple – 
playing strategically lets MLs prevent entry by distinguishing them from MHs, thereby earning 
higher payoffs – but is not immediately obvious to subjects.  In all of the treatments, the modal 
choice of MLs in the first cycle of inexperienced play is their myopic maximum (4) even though 
strategic play yields unambiguously higher expected payoffs.  Team dialogues make it clear that 
this initial lack of strategic play is not a result of mistaken beliefs that choice of the myopic 
maximum will deter entry, but instead reflects a failure to consider Es’ responses to their 
choices.10  In other words, subjects initially miss the insight underlying strategic play.  Once 
realized, this insight can be relatively easy to demonstrate to others as the logic is clear and the 
payoff advantages are overwhelming.  Indeed, while advice is not always followed, advisees 
have significantly higher levels of strategic play than individual play absent any advice.11  
II.  Experimental Design:  For all treatments subjects play the limit pricing game for one 
inexperienced subject session (24 periods) and one experienced subject session (32 periods). 
Inexperienced subjects have not previously played any version of the limit pricing game.  
Experienced subjects have played in an inexperienced subject session of the same treatment.  
The motivation for experienced subject sessions is that it can often take some time for a clean 
separating equilibrium to develop, as well as to determine if any differences in behavior across 
treatments are eliminated once subjects gain more experience.  
Throughout the paper the term “player” refers to an agent in the limit pricing game, 
regardless of whether this agent was an individual subject or a pair of subjects playing as a team.  
The treatments vary who the players are (individuals or teams) and the communication and 
decision protocol employed.    
In the 1x1 treatment, the players are individuals acting in isolation.  They receive feedback 
about the past history of play, as described below but have no direct input from other subjects.   
                                                            
10 See the detailed coding of team dialogues in Cooper and Kagel (2005) using the same procedures as employed 
here.    
11 Team dialogues also support the claim that strategic play is self-confirming.  When one teammate advocates 
strategic play while the other does not, invariably strategic play wins, with bad advice winning the days in 1% of all 




In the 2x2 treatment players are freely interacting two subject teams.  Teams are randomly 
formed at the beginning of a session and remain fixed throughout the session.  Teammates must 
jointly agree on a choice, having (almost) continuous access to a messaging program that allows 
for bilateral communication about possible actions.  Both teammates receive the full payout from 
their team’s outcomes.  
In the self-advice treatment, play was identical to the 1x1 treatment except for one change:  
While making choices, subjects were given a text box and prompted to enter “self-advice”, 
period by period, as play evolved.  Specifically, the instructions told subjects, “... we have reason 
to believe that writing out your thoughts regarding what’s going on helps in making good 
choices.”  Subjects were given continuous access to their self-advice from past plays of the game 
throughout the session.  This treatment was implemented before the advice treatment to see if 
simply getting subjects to think harder about the game and to verbalize whatever insights they 
obtained from playing the game, as occurs in the teams’ treatment, would be sufficient to 
replicate the high levels of strategic play found with teams.  To foreshadow the results reported 
on below, there are no significant differences from the 1x1 treatment absent advice, so that we 
pool the data from the two treatments to provide a baseline against which to evaluate the other 
treatments.   
Subjects in the advice treatment were randomly assigned to two subject pairs, with one 
randomly chosen to be the “advisor” and the other becoming the “advisee.” Pairings and roles 
within a pairing were fixed for the session, as were their roles in any given play of the game.  
Advisors and advisees played the limit pricing game separately, with no need to agree on a 
common action (and no mechanism for doing so).  Advisors had (almost) continuous access to a 
messaging program which they could use to send advice to their advisee.  The instructions 
explicitly describe the messages as “advice.”  Advisees could not communicate with their 
advisors and were under no obligation to pay attention to the advice provided.  Advisors had no 
way to identify the actions of their advisee, limiting the possibility of non-verbal feedback from 
advisees.  Thus, communication in the advice treatment was strictly unilateral.   
To give advisors an incentive to provide useful advice, they received a “bonus” equal to 30% 
of their advisee’s total payoff (along with their own payoff).  These bonus payments were only 
reported at the end of an experimental session so that advisors could not tell what choices their 
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advisees had made. Advisees received their full payoff and had no direct stake in the advisor’s 
outcome.    
In any given play of the game an advisor and his advisee played the same role (an M or an 
E), and were the same type (MH or ML) as Ms.  This was common knowledge, with the 
instructions stressing that an advisor would never play against his advisee.  Es were randomly 
paired with different Ms, with a rotation rule that insured they would not be matched with the 
same M more than once in each cycle of play. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 summarizes the number of sessions and number of subjects employed in each of the 
four treatments, broken down by experience.12 
III. Experimental Procedures:  Inexperienced (experienced) subject sessions used a round 
robin format where each M met a different E for six (four) plays of the game.  Es and Ms then 
switched roles and played for another set of six (four) games.  We refer to the complete set of 
twelve (eight) rounds as a “cycle.” This process repeated itself for a total of 24 (32) games - two 
cycles in an inexperienced subject session and four in an experienced subject session.  The one 
exception to this rule was experienced subject sessions in the 2x2 treatment.  The 2x2 sessions 
took the longest to run, with play swiftly converging to the efficient separating equilibrium in 
experienced subject sessions.  To avoid keeping subjects for an unusually long amount of time, 
only three cycles were run instead of four.  Given the strong convergence to the efficient 
separating equilibrium in the second and third cycle, there is no reason to believe that any further 
changes in behavior would have occurred during a fourth cycle. 
At the beginning of inexperienced subject sessions a common set of instructions were read 
out loud, with each subject having a written copy.13  This ensured common knowledge of the 
payoff structure.  In particular, advisees knew that advisors were paid a bonus based on their 
advisee’s performance and therefore had strong incentives to provide useful advice.  Subjects 
had copies of both Ms’ and Es’ payoff tables and were required to fill out a short questionnaire 
                                                            
12 The 2x2 and advice treatments required that the number of subjects be a multiple of four.  In the cases where we 
were one subject short, one of the lab assistants was employed rather than sending three subjects home and reducing 
the number of players. In the case of teams the lab assistant announced this fact to her “teammate” along with the 
fact that they would agree to whatever choice their partner made.  For the advice sessions the lab assistant was 
assigned the role of advisee, and was instructed to follow whatever advice they were given or, in its absence, what 
the majority of their type was doing. Data for these teams and advisees is excluded from the analysis. 
13 A copy of the instructions is available at http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel. 
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insuring their ability to read them.  After reading the instructions, questions were answered out 
loud and play began with a single practice round followed by a short recapitulation of the 
instructions as well as another opportunity for questions.  At the beginning of experienced 
subject sessions an abbreviated version of the instructions were read out loud with each subject 
having a written copy.  All instructions were framed in abstract terminology.  For example, Ms 
were referred to as A players, with MHs and MLs described as A1s and A2s.  Likewise, Es were 
called B players and choose between x and y rather than IN and OUT.  We use meaningful labels 
throughout the paper to ease the exposition. 
Before each play of the game the computer randomly determined each M’s type.  This 
information was prominently displayed on their computer screens.  Ms’ screens showed payoff 
tables for both types with the table for their own type always displayed on the left as an 
additional means of identifying their type. After making their choices the program highlighted 
Ms’ possible payoffs and required that the choice be confirmed. Once all Ms had confirmed their 
choices, each M’s choice was sent to the E they were paired with.  Es then decided between IN 
and OUT.  Their potential payoffs were highlighted and they were asked to confirm their 
choices.   
Following each play of the game subjects learned their own payoff, the payoff for the player 
they were paired with, and M’s type.  In addition, the lower left-hand portion of each player’s 
screen displayed the results of all pairings: M’s type, M’s output, and E’s response ordered by 
output levels from highest to lowest. The screen automatically displayed the three most recent 
periods of play, with a scroll bar available to see all past periods.14  The TW model assumes that 
subjects can easily confirm that advice to play strategically is correct.  Giving them extensive 
feedback makes it easy to do so since strategic play is overwhelmingly incentive compatible. 
1x1 and self-advice sessions employed between 10 - 16 subjects while 2x2 sessions used 16 - 
24 subjects resulting in between 8 – 12 players in the team sessions.15  The number of subjects in 
the advice sessions varied widely, ranging from a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 28.  This 
variation was intentional.  We initially employed relatively large sessions with 20 or more 
subjects, but this raised a potential confound for comparison with the other treatments as subjects 
                                                            
14 This information was color coded with one color for all MLs and another for all MHs.   
15  The somewhat smaller team sessions result from the fact that twice as many subjects are needed per player in the 
2x2 treatment in conjunction with limited lab space and variation in show-up rates, particularly for experienced 
subject sessions due to the failure of some subjects to return.    
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receive feedback from the entire population of players, resulting in up to twice as much feedback 
regarding population play as the other treatments. To control for this, we replicated all of the 
advice sessions using a maximum of 16 subjects.  This difference in the number of players had 
virtually no effect on the results reported and will generally not be dealt with except as a control 
variable in the regressions. 
Subjects were recruited through e-mail announcements directed primarily to introductory 
economics classes at Ohio State University.  Most sessions employed a “double header” design 
requiring subjects to commit to both an inexperienced and experienced subject session at the 
same time with the show-up fee ($20), along with half of session one’s earnings, withheld until a 
subject had completed the second session.  As part of the process subjects had to agree to come 
back to one of two scheduled experienced subject sessions, with the inexperienced and 
experienced sessions conducted within a two week period of each other. This recruiting 
procedure induced most subjects (87%) to return for an experienced subject session.16  There are 
no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of strategic play by subjects who did not 
return and those who did.  Since subjects could choose between two experienced subject 
sessions, these sessions contained a mix of subjects from different inexperienced sessions.  By 
the same token, it was not possible to keep pairings or roles fixed across sessions. 
Inexperienced (experienced) subject sessions lasted a little under two (one and a half) hours. 
All payments were in cash, with the experimental currency (“francs”) converted to dollars at a 
400:1 ration. Earnings averaged slightly less than $69 for a subject who completed both sessions, 
including the $20 show-up fee. 
IV. Initial Hypotheses:  The results section focuses on comparing levels of strategic play of 
MLs as advisors and advisees, as well as comparing MLs’ strategic play in the advice treatment 
with the 1x1 and 2x2 sessions.  This section formulates initial hypotheses about these treatment 
effects by extending the TW model to the advisor-advisee sessions.  Let p(T) be the probability 
that an individual in treatment T   {1x1, 2x2, self-advice, advisor, advisee} plays strategically 
as an ML independent from being told the solution by another subject.  The probability of an 
individual with access to input from a group of size N playing strategically in treatment T is 1 - 
                                                            
16 As a methodological check, we ran half of the 1x1 sessions using standard recruiting methods with no special 
inducement to return.  Not surprisingly, the percentage of subjects returning was substantially lower (65%) than in 
the “double headers” (95% in the 1x1 treatment, 87% overall).  The data shows that the recruiting method did not 
systematically affect the likelihood of MLs playing strategically.  
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(1 - p(T)*(1-PL))N, where PL ≥ 0 represents “process loss”.  If PL = 0 this is the standard TW 
benchmark where a group solves the problem if any individual solves it. 
The process loss term, PL, has a very specific interpretation in this generalized version of the 
TW model.  It does not represent changes in individual behavior due to treatment effects – these 
are captured through the p(T) function.  Thus, factors that are natural examples of process loss in 
teams, such as distraction due to irrelevant conversation or reduced effort from free-riding, are 
incorporated into p(T) rather than PL.  Instead, PL relates directly to the assumption underlying 
the TW model, that a group solves the problem if any of its members solves it.  Even with a 
problem where the solution is verifiable, this assumption might not hold as individuals may fail 
to communicate a solution to others or fail to persuade others that the solution is correct.  PL 
gives the probability that an individual who has successfully solved the problem fails to 
successfully communicate the solution to the other group members.  As noted previously, this 
rarely happens in the 2x2 treatment.  In formulating hypotheses below, we adopt the simplifying 
assuming that PL = 0 for both the 2x2 and the advice treatment, but in discussing the results of 
the advice treatment we relate performance by advisees to strong evidence that PL > 0.    
The probability of playing strategically as an ML in the 1x1 treatment reduces to p(1x1).  If 
p(2x2) = p(1x1), the probability of an N person team solving the problem reduces to the standard 
TW benchmark:  1 1 (1 1) Np x  .  If teams meet or beat the TW benchmark it follows that 
p(2x2) ≥ p(1x1) in spite of the factors (free-riding, distraction) mentioned above. 
The self-advice treatment does not require subjects to convince a teammate to follow a 
particular course of action.  The probability of solving the problem therefore reduces to p (self-
advice).  We are unaware of any results in the psychology literature, one way or the other, on this 
point.17  As such we adopt a null hypothesis of no effect on behavior as a result of self-advice. 
Self-Advice H1:  Self-advice has no effect on the probability of strategic play compared to a 
standard 1x1 treatment in which players had no opportunity to comment on their strategies and 
thoughts: p(self-advice) = p(1x1).   
For the advice treatment we distinguish between advisors and advisees.  The null hypothesis 
for advisors is: 
                                                            
17 “Talk aloud” protocols are the closest analogue we are aware of to our self-advice treatment (Ericsson and Simon, 
1980).    
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Advisor H1:  Giving advice has no effect on the probability of strategic play: p(advisor) = 
p(1x1).18  The frequency of MLs’ strategic play as advisors equals the frequency of strategic play 
in the 1x1 treatment, with or without self-advice. 
H1 is based on the idea that since advisors are essentially working on their own (only one 
head to work with) there is no reason to believe that they will play any more strategically than 
subjects in either the 1x1 or the self-advice treatments.  There are several reasons why this null 
hypothesis might not hold.19  First, the psychology literature on accountability suggests that self-
critical and effortful thinking is most likely to be activated when decision makers know that they 
will be accountable to an audience that is interested in accuracy and is reasonably well informed 
(Lerner and Tetlock, 1999), as advisors were.  Other factors that might promote higher levels of 
strategic play include (i) increased monetary incentives as advisors earnings include a modest 
percentage of their advisees earnings (however, the literature suggests that such a modest 
increase in incentives will have no major impact on outcomes; see Smith and Walker, 1993, for 
example) and (ii) to the extent that advisees, on account of having two heads to work with, play 
more strategically as Ms and are more sensitive to the incentives to enter as Es (increasing the 
entry rate differential between 4 and 6), advisors receive more informative feedback and face 
stronger incentives to play strategically than subjects in the 1x1 and self-advice sessions.   
We propose two alternative hypotheses for advisees.    
Advisee H1:  Receiving advice has no effect on the probability of strategic play: π(advisee) = 
π(1x1) = p(1x1).   
Advisee H2:  An advisee plays strategically if his advisor plays strategically; otherwise he plays 
strategically with the same probability as a subject in the 1x1 treatment:  
π(advisee) = 1- (1 – p(advisor))*(1-p(1x1)) > p(1x1). 
Advisee H1 is the null and is based on the idea that advisees are under no obligation to 
follow the advice they receive and can choose to completely ignore it.  If so, they should play no 
differently than subjects in the 1x1 treatment.  Advisee H2 draws on the logic of the TW model.  
An advisor who figures out how to play strategically as an ML should recognize the value of this 
                                                            
18 Alternatively p (advisor) = p (self-advice).  To foreshadow the experimental results and to simplify the 
specifications, in what follows we drop the distinction between p (1x1) and p (self-advice).    
19 Greater strategic play by advisors would be consistent with the results of Iyengar and Schotter (2008), who report 
that in a decision theoretic context advisors, who did not make choices themselves but were paid on the basis of their 
advisees’ choices, came closer to the optimal choice than subjects deciding alone (either as advisors or advisees).   
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insight and pass it on to their advisee.  Advisees who receive advice to play strategically should 
follow it.  In other words, there should be no process loss.  An advisee might also figure things 
out on their own absent any advice to play strategically.  Assuming that receiving bad (or at least 
not useful) advice has no effect on their behavior, the probability of an advisee figuring out 
strategic play on their own should be the same as in the 1x1 treatment.  Taken together, these 
generate the version of the TW benchmark given in Advisee H2.  Advisee H2 predicts higher 
levels of strategic play for advisees than in the 1x1 treatment.  This does not reflect advisees 
being any better at figuring out how to play strategically, but instead is strictly a function of them 
having two heads (their own and their advisor’s) to rely upon.    
V.  Results: The efficient separating equilibrium gradually emerges in all four treatments.  
Figure 1 shows data from the 1x1 treatment, but the dynamics are similar across treatments, 
varying primarily in speed of convergence.  MLs start out largely ignoring the strategic 
possibilities of the game, choosing their myopic maximum (4), even though entry rates make 
strategic play (MLs choosing 5, 6 or 7) incentive compatible by a wide margin from the start.  
Over time MLs learn to distinguish themselves from MHs by choosing 5 or, more frequently, 6.  
Our focus is on the development of strategic play under the different treatments.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
5.1 1x1 versus the self-advice treatment:  Figure 2 compares strategic play for MLs in the 1x1 
and self-advice treatments.  The differences between the two treatments are modest, and the 
regression shown in Table 3 reports no statistically significant differences.  This regression is a 
logit model with nested random effects at the session and team/individual level.  The dataset 
includes all ML observations from the 1x1 and self-advice treatments.  The dependent variable is 
a dummy for strategic play and the independent variables include dummies for the current cycle, 
interactions between the cycle dummies and a dummy for the self-advice treatment, the number 
of subjects in the session, and the entry rate differential.  The latter is the difference in entry rates 
between 4 and 6 for the current cycle.  It is calculated across all observations from the same 
session for the current cycle, since subjects see all entry decisions in their session.  The entry rate 
differential controls for the incentives to play strategically.     
The variables of interest are the interactions between the cycle dummies and the self-advice 
treatment.  These capture the difference in each cycle between the 1x1 and self-advice 
treatments.  None of these six variables is statistically significant, nor are the six variables jointly 
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significant (χ2 =8.49; p = 0.205).   Given this lack of statistical significance, in what follows we 
pool the data from the 1x1 and self-advice treatments for MLs.20  
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 3 here] 
A natural guess for why self-advice has no effect is that subjects might have written little 
self-advice since there was no direct incentive to do so and subjects had only our word that it 
would be helpful.  In fact, use of self-advice was common for inexperienced subjects as 65% 
entered at least one piece of relevant self-advice (how to choose as either an M or E, or in 
reference to the population data provided), with relevant self-advice being recorded on average 
in 4.8 rounds of inexperienced subject play.  
Conclusion 1:  MLs strategic play in the self-advice sessions is statistically indistinguishable 
from the level of strategic play in the 1x1 sessions.  
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 4 Here] 
5.2 1x1 versus the 2x2 treatment: Figure 3 compares MLs’ strategic play in the 1x1 and 2x2 
treatments.  The TW benchmark is also shown, including error bars for the 90% confidence 
interval.21  MLs’ strategic play is higher in the 2x2 treatment than in the 1x1 treatment for all 
cycles, with teams achieving 100% strategic play in the second and third cycles of experienced 
subject play.  Teams meet or beat the TW benchmark in each cycle of play, replicating earlier 
results for the same game (Cooper and Kagel, 2005).  As noted earlier, the fact that teams act 
more strategically than individuals is a common finding (see Charness and Sutter, 2012, and 
Kugler, Kausel, and Kocher, 2012, for recent reviews of the literature), but it is far less common 
for them to meet or beat the TW benchmark (Davis, 1992).22  
                                                            
20 Our conclusions are little affected by alternative specifications, such as use of a linear probabilities model or 
estimating the treatment effects without controls for the session size and entry rate differential. 
21 The formula for the truth wins bench mark based on play in the 1x1 treatment is 1 – (1 – p(1x1))2.  Because of 
clustering in the data, simulations are needed to correctly calculate the error bars. The simulated 2x2 data is based on 
250,000 simulated 2x2 data sets for each cycle of play, with the same number of teams in each data set as in the 
experiment. Simulated 2x2 play is based on randomly drawing two subjects (with replacement) from the 1x1 
sessions. A simulated team was considered to have played strategically if either of its members played strategically. 
The error bars then display the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of percentages of strategic play in a 
simulated 2x2 data set. 
22 The level of strategic play here is substantially higher for both the 1x1 and the 2x2 treatments than reported in 
Cooper and Kagel (2005), even though we are using the same procedures and the same subject pool. The proximate 
cause for this appears to be substantial increases in SAT/ACT scores and high school class rank of entering 
freshmen at Ohio State.  We plan to explore the relationship between cognitive ability and strategic play in another 
paper (Cooper and Kagel, work in progress).   
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The regression reported in Table 4 documents that the difference between the 1x1 and 2x2 
treatments is statistically significant.  The dataset includes all ML observations from all 
treatments.  The dependent variable is strategic play (choice of 5, 6, or 7).  Independent variables 
include dummies for the current cycle, interactions between the cycle dummies and treatment 
dummies, the number of players in the session, and the entry rate differential between 4 and 6.  
The 1x1 and self-advice data have been pooled and will be referred to as the “1x1 data,” which 
serves as the baseline against which to compare the 2x2, advisors, and advisees.  The variables of 
primary interest are interactions between the cycle dummies and the treatment dummies.  These 
capture the difference between the treatments and the 1x1 data.  The number of players reflects 
the number of individuals for all treatments except the 2x2 treatment where it reflects the number 
of teams – the number of players in the advice treatment was systematically varied to determine 
whether differences between the advice and 2x2 treatments are due to differing amounts of 
feedback.  The entry rate differential between 4 and 6 is calculated in the same fashion as 
described for Table 3.  Random effects are at the session and individual/team level.23  Focusing 
on the interaction terms for the 2x2 treatment, all are significant at the 5% level or better. 
Conclusion 2:   MLs’ strategic play in the 2x2 sessions is consistently higher than in 1x1 sessions 
and meets or exceeds the TW benchmark in each cycle of play.  This replicates the results 
reported in Cooper and Kagel (2005). 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
5.3 1x1 versus the advice treatment:  Figure 4 compares MLs strategic play in the 1x1 and advice 
treatments.  Data for advisors and advisees is reported separately.  Advisors’ initial level of 
strategic play is slightly higher than in the 1x1 treatment, and the gap increases for the second 
cycle of inexperienced play.  This difference is eliminated for experienced subjects, with 
advisors’ strategic play slightly lower than in the 1x1 treatment in the last three cycles of 
experienced subject play.  Advisees consistently do better than advisors with the difference 
varying little over time. Advisee’s strategic play is higher than in 1x1 games for both 
inexperienced cycles, especially Cycle 2, but dips slightly below the 1x1 treatment in the last two 
cycles of experienced play.  
                                                            
23 For the advice treatment, the second random effect is at the level of an advisor-advisee pair rather than the 
individual advisor or advisee.  Even if no advice is sent, advisors and advisees share a common history of roles and 
types which may induce correlation, so we take a conservative approach.  Once again, the results are robust to the 
use of alternative specifications. 
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Returning to the regression analysis reported in Table 4, strategic play by advisors is only 
significantly higher than in the 1x1 treatment for the second cycle of inexperienced play (and is 
significantly lower for the final cycle of experienced play).  For advisees there is  significantly 
more strategic play than in the 1x1 treatment for the second cycle of inexperienced play (p < 
0.01) and (weakly) for the first cycle of experienced play (p < 0.10).  At no point does strategic 
play for advisees dip significantly below levels for the 1x1 treatment.24   
Advisees’ strategic play relative to their TW benchmark (Advisee H2) is also shown in 
Figure 4 along with error bars for the 90% confidence interval.  To reiterate the basic idea, an 
advisee should play strategically if either his advisor plays strategically (the TW model assumes 
that an advisor always passes on advice to play strategically and this advice is always followed) 
or if an advisee figures it out on his own (which is assumed to happen with the same probability 
as in the 1x1 sessions).  The TW benchmark is not met as advisees’ strategic play is always 
below it, with the differences statistically significant in all but the second cycle of inexperienced 
subject play.  
Conclusion 3: Both advisors and advisees have higher levels of strategic play than in the 1x1 
treatment through the first cycle of experienced subject play, at which point strategic play tapers 
off with the 1x1s catching up. Advisees play strategically more often than advisors in all cycles 
of play, but less than their (modified) version of the TW benchmark.     
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
5.4 Process Loss in the Advisor-Advisee Treatment:  The failure of advisees to meet the TW 
benchmark is illustrated by Figure 5.  Their TW model assumes that (1) an advisee matched with 
an advisor who does not play strategically should play strategically no less than subjects in the 
1x1 treatment (since they might figure out strategic play on their own), and (2) advisees whose 
advisors play strategically should always play strategically since their advisor communicates the 
relevant information and the advisee follow the advice.  Part (1) holds for inexperienced subjects, 
as there is no significant difference in strategic play between the 1x1 treatment and advisees 
whose advisors are not playing strategically. However, part (2) fails for inexperienced subjects, 
as slightly more than a quarter of the advisees whose advisors played strategically did not play 
                                                            
24 The difference between advisors and advisees is significant in the second cycle of inexperienced play, as well 




strategically themselves.  While these advisees play strategically significantly more often than in 
the 1x1 treatment as well as those advisees whose advisors did not play strategically, they do not 
come close to the 100% strategic play that Part (2) of their TW model requires.  Part (2) of the 
TW model also fails for experienced subjects: Advisees whose advisors play strategically play 
strategically 90% of the time.  However, given the high rate of strategic play for experienced 
subjects (83%) in the 1x1 treatment, this 10% failure rate is sufficient for the TW benchmark not 
to be met.   
To better understand the failure of the advisor-advisee pairings to meet the TW benchmark, 
we coded the content of the advice given in relationship to subjects’ behavior.  Advisors’ 
messages were coded using two simple categories: (1) Was a subject advised to play strategically 
as an ML (i.e., given explicit advice to choose 5, 6 or 7); and (2) Was a subject given an 
explanation of why he/she should play strategically as an ML.  An explanation of strategic play 
was broadly defined – it was sufficient, for example, to say that strategic play would make entry 
less likely without providing any reason this might be true.  Two research assistants scored the 
first time (if ever) a comment in each category was made.  Agreement between the two coders 
was high – they agreed on the first occurrence in Categories 1 and 2 for 85% and 90% of all 
observations respectively.  We also coded how many times each advisor provided relevant 
advice, where relevant advice is defined as any message on how to play as an M or E.25  Before 
discussing the results of this coding exercise, it is useful to clarify some terminology:  If we say 
that an advisee has “received advice to play strategically in Period t,” this means that the first 
time they were advised to play strategically as an ML occurred in Period s ≤ t of that session.  In 
other words, once an advisee has received advice to play strategically, they are assumed to retain 
that advice for the remainder of the session.  This is a reasonable assumption as advisees can 
access past messages, advice to play strategically is never contradicted in later periods, and the 
nature of advice makes it unlikely that advisors will feel the need to repeatedly give the same 
advice.  Extending this terminology, when we state that xx% of advisees in Block XX received 
advice to play strategically, this means that xx% of the observations of advisees in Block XX 
received advice to play strategically.  Further, stating that their advisor has played strategically in 
Period t means that the advisor first played strategically as an ML in Period s ≤ t.   
                                                            




5.5 Process Loss Attributable to Advisors: Most advisees received at least some relevant advice 
– 85.4% (78.4%) of inexperienced (experienced) advisees received at least one piece of relevant 
advice during an experimental session.  Relevant advice was fairly common in general, with 
inexperienced (experienced) subjects averaging 7.3 (7.4) relevant messages per session. 
However, even though 70% of inexperienced advisors played strategically at least once (chose 5, 
6 or 7), in only 57%  of these cases was the  advisee explicitly told to play strategically.   
A number of potential explanations for this breakdown in advice giving have been suggested. 
One possibility is that advisors who fail to give advice have less experience with strategic play 
than those who give advice.  However this is not the case: Among inexperienced advisors who 
play strategically at least once, those who never send advice to play strategically are themselves 
playing strategically an average of 3.6 times per session, only slightly less than the average of 
3.8 times for those who do send advice to play strategically.26  As another way of making this 
point, consider advisors who first play strategically in the first half of the session (Cycle 1 for 
inexperienced sessions, Cycles 1 and 2 for experienced sessions).  In inexperienced 
(experienced) sessions, 41% (38%) of these advisors never advise their partners to play 
strategically.27 As such the failure to give useful advice reflects something deeper than a lack of 
understanding or opportunity. 
Second, it’s been suggested that by giving advisors a bonus based on their advisee’s earnings, 
we may have inadvertently incentivized advisors to hedge their payoffs, playing strategically 
while advising otherwise for their advisee.  We checked for this explicitly in each of the nine 
inexperienced subject sessions.  We could not find a single instance in which an advisor who had 
played strategically gave advice to play non-strategically.28  This lack of hedging makes sense 
since the incentives for MLs to clearly distinguish themselves from MHs are so strong from very 
early on that advisors would have to be quite risk averse to hedge in this way.  There are also 
obvious social conventions which likely inhibit advisors from hedging.   
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
Third, it was suggested that part of the explanation for this breakdown in advice giving could 
be gender based.  Given that women are less confident in their abilities than men in a number of 
                                                            
26 The corresponding numbers for experienced subjects are 6.6 and 7.8 strategic plays per session. 
27 In Cycle 2 of inexperienced play, these advisors played strategically 81% of the time as MLs.  The equivalent 
figure for Cycles 3 and 4 of experienced play is 84%. 
28 We also checked if any advisors who chose 5 advised choosing 6, or vice versa.  This never happened.      
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strategic settings (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), it seemed plausible that this lack of 
confidence would translate into unwillingness to give advice.   Much to our surprise this turns 
out to be the case as men are much more likely to give advice to play strategically than women in 
all cycles of play, both unconditionally and conditional on having played strategically 
themselves.  In the first cycle of inexperienced subject play, 72% of the men who played 
strategically also gave advice to this effect, whereas none of the women who played strategically 
did so (see Figure 6).  Even in experienced subject play, women who have played strategically 
never get above 50% for offering advice.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 presents results from Cox hazard rate models formally confirming that men and 
women differ in their speed to offer advice.  The dataset includes all advisors whose gender is 
known.   The dependent variable is the first time advice is given to play strategically (censored if 
advice hasn’t been given when the session ends), resulting in one observation per advisor per 
session. We report the coefficient values and standard errors (in parentheses) for each 
independent variable.  A positive (negative) coefficient implies that the advisor will be faster 
(slower), ceteris paribus, to provide advice to play strategically.  Since an advisor can appear in 
the dataset twice (as inexperienced and experienced), the standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the advisor level.  All three models include controls for the advisor’s gender, 
whether the advisor is experienced, the number of advisors in the session (session sizes were 
systematically varied), and the entry rate differential.   
Model 1 is a basic regression with no further controls.  The gender dummy has a negative 
sign, which is significant at the 5% level.  
Model 2 adds a control for advisors’ experience with strategic play (the percentage of times 
an advisor chose to play strategically as an ML, scaled from 0 to 1).  By controlling for 
differences in the frequency of strategic play, we rule out the obvious explanation that gender 
differences result from women being less likely to play strategically than men in the signaling 
game.  Not surprisingly, advisors who play more strategically are also significantly faster to offer 
advice to play strategically.  The gender dummy remains statistically significant, albeit at the 
10% level.  
Model 3 adds an interaction effect between the percentage of strategic play and gender.  The 
gender dummy is now positive, while the interaction between strategic play and gender is 
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negative.  Both gender variables, the dummy and interaction terms, are significant at the 1% 
level, and are jointly significant at the 1% level (χ2 = 13.1).  Looking at the two gender variables 
together, as the proportion of strategic play approaches 100%, Model 3 shows that women are 
less likely to provide advice to play strategically p < 0.01), consistent with the raw data in Figure 
6. 29  Interestingly, the model also shows that with 0% strategic play women are more likely to 
provide advice to play strategically than men (the significant positive coefficient for the gender 
dummy).  This too is consistent with the raw data: inexperienced (experienced) women advisors 
who have not played strategically provide advice to this effect 16% (17%) of the time versus 5% 
(2%) for men.  In short, comparing advisors who have played strategically, men are more likely 
to provide advice to this effect than women.  But comparing advisors who have not played 
strategically, women are more likely to provide correct advice to play strategically than men.  
Both effects point to men being more confident in their beliefs regarding strategic play than 
women.   
As a final piece of evidence, there are no significant or consistent differences between men 
and women in the extent to which they provide bad advice (advice to not play strategically as an 
ML), ruling out the notion that men are simply more prone to providing advice, good or bad, as 
an explanation for the gender effect reported.  
Conclusion 5: A major cause of advisees’ failure to meet TW benchmark is that advisors who 
play strategically fail to give advice to this effect. Underlying this failure are significant 
differences between men and women in the frequency of providing advice to play strategically.  
Women are significantly less likely to provide such advice conditional on having played 
strategically.  
Our findings about advisors’ failures to provide useful advice, as well as the strong gender 
differences in the provision of advice, have not been previously identified in either the 
economics or psychology literatures.  We conjecture that the difference between men and women 
is driven by men’s greater confidence in their insightfulness.  Given that there is no doubt 
substantial variation in confidence levels within our sample of men and women, this implies that 
                                                            
29 Formally, we redo Model 3 with the ratio for strategic play set to 1 in place of % Strategic Play.  The gender 
dummy now captures the difference between women and men at 100% strategic play.  The coefficient is negative (-
1.102) and significant at the 1% level (standard error = .370). 
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a lack of confidence accounts for the failure to advise strategic play after having played 
strategically regardless of gender.    
5.6 Process Loss Attributable to Advisees: In about a third of all cases advisees who were given 
sound advice to play strategically failed to follow that advice. As noted earlier this result 
parallels  findings from the psychology and economics literature on advice taking and decision 
making where one of the most robust findings is that advisees do not follow advisor’s 
recommendations nearly as much as is optimal, referred to in the psychology literature as 
egocentric advice discounting.  The failure of advisees to follow good advice is especially 
puzzling in our experiment since advisees knew that advisors had financial incentives to provide 
useful advice and received extensive population feedback that allowed them to easily verify that 
strategic play was optimal. 
A surprising element of advisees’ behavior, with no existing parallel in the literature on 
advice, is that being given an explanation as to why they should play strategically has essentially 
no more impact on inexperienced advisees than simply being told to choose 5, 6, or 7.  Table 6 
documents this for both inexperienced (top panel) and experienced subjects (bottom panel). 
Observations are distinguished by whether the advisee had ever been told to play strategically 
and whether the advisee had ever been given an explanation for playing strategically.30  For each 
cell we report the frequency of strategic play along with the number of observations in each cell 
(in parentheses).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
For inexperienced subjects there clearly is no differential effect from being provided with an 
explanation.  Although it appears that providing an explanation has a positive marginal impact 
for experienced subjects, the econometric analysis reported below shows that the marginal 
impact of an explanation is not statistically significant for either inexperienced or experienced 
advisees.  The fact that there is no significant increase in the likelihood of strategic play after 
being given an explanation suggests that the primary effect of advice is to make subjects 
consider strategic play.31 Economists and game theorists typically assume that decision makers 
                                                            
30 While rare, there are a few instances in which advisees’ were given an explanation for why they should play 
strategically without ever being given explicit advice to choose 5, 6 or 7. For example, one advisor wrote, “You 
want to make the [entrant] think that you are [an ML] so they will choose [Out].”  However, this advisor failed to 
explicitly tell the advisee to choose 5, 6 or 7 to achieve this outcome.          
31Another possible reason that explanations fail to have a significant positive effect is that many explanations are 
poor quality.  We did not have coders rank the quality of explanations, judging this to be excessively subjective, but 
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consider all possible actions, but the psychology literature indicates that they routinely neglect 
some possibilities.  External prompting can get decision makers to actively consider otherwise 
ignored options (see, for example, Mussweller et al., 2000 and Lord et al., 1984).32  In our 
experiment, entry is much higher on 2 than on 4 in the first several plays of the game.  This tends 
to reinforce MLs’ initial beliefs that their myopic strategy (4) is best.  As a result they become 
locked in on 4 and fail to notice that choice of 6 is actually a better option.  As such the primary 
role of advice appears to be to get MLs to reconsider an option that they had previously 
dismissed.  
The low impact of receiving an explanation makes the occurrence of egocentric advice 
discounting especially striking in our experiment.  The entry rate differential on 4 versus 6 is 
such that there is a demonstrably correct course of action in the limit pricing game.  Yet, even 
with the benefit of an explanation, about a third of inexperienced advisees fail to follow advice to 
play strategically.33 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 provides formal backing for these assertions.  The dataset is limited to observations 
from advisees playing as MLs and the dependent variable is a dummy for strategic play.  The 
independent variables of primary interest are dummies for what sort of advice has been received, 
either in the current period or previously in the session.  We account for three types of advice: 
(1) has the advisee been advised to play strategically as an ML, (2) has the advisee received an 
explanation for why he/she should play strategically as an ML, and (3) has the advisee received 
bad advice.  Bad advice refers to cases where the advisee has specifically been told not to play 
strategically as an ML (i.e., choose 4) and has not received later advice countermanding the 
suggestion to play non-strategically. The three dummies for types of advice are interacted with 
                                                            
it was obvious that the quality of explanations ranged widely.  However, to claim that the lack of an effect is based 
strictly on the low quality of explanations is implausible.  The many cases where the explanation was minimal (e.g., 
“I think we pick 6 as a2s [MLs] and 4 as a1s [MHs] that way we insure they pick y [out] when we’re an a2”) are 
balanced by the many cases where the explanations provided were quite good (“obviously if they pick a 6 or 7 they 
are an A2 [ML] because no one will pick a negative number…..if you’re an A2 pick 6 because they will know 
you’re an A2 and no matter pick y [out]).   
32 Schotter (2003) makes a similar conjecture based on data from a numbers game against nature with an observer 
providing written advice to the decision maker.  Our data strengthens the evidence for this conjecture by showing 
that an explanation for use of strategic play is not necessary for advice to have a positive effect on outcomes. 
33 On average, advisees who received advice to play strategically earned 15 francs more per period as an ML than 




dummies for inexperienced andexperienced play.  The regression also includes dummies for the 
current cycle of play.  Random effects are at the session and individual/pairing level. 
For inexperienced play, there is a positive and significant effect on strategic play from having 
received advice to play strategically and a negative and (weakly) significant effect from bad 
advice.  The negative effect of bad advice makes it even more difficult for advisees to reach the 
TW benchmark since the model assumes that incorrect advice is ignored.  The effect of receiving 
an explanation for advice to play strategically is positive, but small and nowhere close to 
statistical significance.  The results for experienced play are similar but weaker.  Advice to play 
strategically again has a significant effect, but only at the 10% level.  Oddly, bad advice has a 
positive effect on strategic play, albeit nowhere close to statistical significance.  Once again there 
is little effect from receiving an explanation for why the advisee should play strategically.   
Conclusion 6: The marginal impact of providing an explanation as to the logic underlying why 
their advice should be followed has no appreciable impact on the likelihood that the advice will 
be followed.   As such the primary impact of advice appears to be to get subjects to consider 
alternative strategies that they have come to ignore.  
Having documented a strong gender effect in the giving of advice, we looked into whether 
there might be strong gender differences in acting on advice to play strategically.  The effect of 
advice to play strategically is consistently larger for woman than men.  However, these 
differences between the genders do not achieve statistical significance in the data.34   
5.7 Advice versus 2x2 Teams: Figure 7 compares strategic play in the 2x2 games with advisors 
and advisees.  For all cycles, strategic play is greater in the 2x2 treatment than for either advisors 
or advisees.  This difference is significant for advisors in both inexperienced (at the 10% level) 
and experienced subject play, and for advisees in experienced subject play.   
[Insert Fig 7 here] 
There are also substantial differences in the amount of relevant information exchanged in the 
team discussions compared to the monologues in the advice treatment. In the inexperienced 2x2 
sessions, relevant advice was exchanged in 70% of all periods compared to 22% of all periods in 
                                                            
34 We have modified the model in Table WW by adding dummies for inexperienced and experienced women as well 
as interactions between these dummies and dummies for having received advice to play strategically.  The 
interaction terms are both positive but are not statistically significant for either inexperienced (z = 0.79) or 
experienced (z = 1.47) women. 
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the inexperienced advice treatment.35  The corresponding percentages for experienced subjects, 
although lower, are also quite different: 34% of all periods in the 2x2 sessions versus 16% in the 
advice sessions.  All of the inexperienced teams exchanged at least one piece of relevant 
information at some point during an experimental session compared to 85% for inexperienced 
advisors.36  Most importantly, 46% of inexperienced advisors explicitly suggested play of 5, 6, or 
7 compared to 78% of inexperienced teams discussing the benefits of such choices.  The  
substantially more complete information exchange in the 2x2 treatment no doubt contributes to 
the fact that teams meet or beat the TW benchmark compared to advisees who consistently fail to 
meet their (modified) TW benchmark.   
This free flowing two way communication also serves to clarify the correctness of a strategic 
insight from one teammate to another, which is not available in the advisor-advisee treatment.  
The following discussion illustrates one of a number of such cases we have identified, in this 
case for an ML team deciding to choose 6:  
10: “do you want to go with 6?”    
14: “what about 4? Okay” 
10: “if we choose 4 they will choose x for sure”     
10: “if we go with 6 we are guaranteed 592” 
14: “why? they can choose y (OUT) for 50 more”   
14: “and we both get bigger one” 
10: “what do you mean?” 
14: “if we choose 4, they will know we are a2 because 4 is the biggest in a2”  “and in a2 y is 
bigger for them” 
10: “but everytime 4 has been chosen, each time the b response has been x (IN)” 
Teams resemble the advice treatment along one important dimension, gender.  When subjects 
play as individuals, men are slightly more likely than women to play strategically as MLs.37  This 
effect is much more dramatic in the 2x2 treatment.  For inexperienced subject session, teams 
with two men play strategically almost twice as frequently as those containing at least one 
woman (84% vs 46%), with this difference statistically significant.38  Teams with two men are 
                                                            
35 All of the figures in this paragraph come from the limited coding of the 2x2 data reported noted previously, which 
was done by a single coder.  
36 Corresponding values for experienced subjects are 90% for teams versus 78% of advisors.   
37 Across treatments where subject choose as individuals (1x1, advisors, advisees) we observe more strategic play by 
men than women.  The difference isn’t large, roughly 10%, but consistent and, at times, statistically significant.  
38 This result is based on a relatively small sample of 31 teams, 12 of which were all male. ,  
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also (weakly) significantly faster to discuss strategic play.39  Given the small difference between 
men and women playing as individuals, we suspect that the gender effect within teams has 
similar roots as the gender effect with advisors.  That is, we conjecture that men are more 
confident about their insights than women and are therefore more willing to share them within a 
team, without which one loses much of the “two heads” effect.  
Conclusion 7:  Strategic play is greater in the 2x2 treatment than for either advisors or advisees. 
There are substantially higher levels of relevant communication between teammates than from 
advisors to advisees which, among other things, serves to reinforce the correctness of the 
strategic insights from one teammate to another. 
VI. Alternative Advice Treatment: One important purpose of our experiment was to explore 
why teams are able to beat the TW norm in the limit pricing game.  The poor performance of 
advisees relative to the TW norm implies that bilateral communication is a necessary element for 
teams’ strong performance, but it is possible that other elements of the experimental design have 
artificially reduced the performance of advisees.  The advice treatment differs from the 2x2 
treatment along two dimensions which could affect performance: (1) advisors do not receive the 
full payoff from their partner’s choice and (2) they are playing the game independently from 
their advisee as well as providing advice.  There were important reasons for these design choices.  
If advisors had not been playing as well as advising, we would not easily have detected their 
failure to pass along insights to play strategically as an ML.  Nonetheless, it is possible that 
advisors with a greater stake in their advisee’s choice, and no distractions due to playing their 
own game, would provide more effective advice resulting in more strategic play by advisees.  
We address this possibility by running a follow-up treatment, the “Alternative Advice” 
treatment. 
The Alternative Advice treatment is a hybrid of the Advice and 2x2 treatment.  As in the 
2x2 treatments, subjects are formed into fixed two person teams that play a single game in each 
round.  Each of the partners receives the full payoff from this game.  As in the Advice treatment, 
teammates are assigned fixed roles as either an advisor or an advisee.  At the beginning of each 
round, the advisors are provided with a text box where they can type a message to their advisee.  
                                                            
39 On both strategic play and speed of discussing strategic play, there is little difference between teams with one or 
two women.  These differences disappear with experienced subjects.  Since virtually all teams play strategically 
when experienced, there is little room for an effect to occur. 
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The advisees see these messages prior to choosing an action, but cannot respond.  The advisors 
have exactly the same information as the advisees.  They know whether they are an ML, MH, or 
E, and as an E they know the choice made by the M player.  The decision for the team is made 
by the advisee.  Since advisors’ payoffs are dependent solely on the actions of their advisees, 
they presumably have strong incentive to give good advice.  At the end of each round, both 
advisors and advisees receive the same feedback as in the Advice treatment.  They both see the 
full set of outcomes for all pairs in a period as well as a history window showing previous 
outcomes.  For advisors, the outcome for their advisee is not specifically identified (although it 
often can be inferred).  As in the Advice treatment this was done to cut a possible back channel 
of communication from advisees to advisors.   
We ran four sessions of the Alternative Advice treatment with 24 subjects in each 
session.  All sessions were intended to run for a total of 32 rounds, although one was terminated 
after 19 rounds due to a software failure.  The 32 rounds were subdivided in two cycles of twelve 
rounds and one cycle of eight rounds, matching the two cycles of an inexperienced subject 
session and the first cycle of an experienced subject session in all of the other experiments 
reported on.  Given the high levels of strategic play observed in the latter part of experienced 
subject sessions, we felt that little would be learned by running longer sessions or bringing 
subjects back for an experienced subject sessions.  Eschewing experienced subject sessions also 
eliminated any difficulties with keeping subjects in the same role, a key consideration.   As in 
other sessions, subjects were randomly assigned teammates and roles, and were flipped between 
the M and E roles after each half cycle.  
[Insert Fig 8 here] 
 The main result for the Alternative Advice treatment can be seen in Figure 8.  This shows 
the percentage of strategic play by MLs, broken down by cycle.  As points of comparison, 
strategic play is also shown for the 1x1 treatment and advises from the Advice treatment.  While 
advisees from the Advice treatment consistently do better than the 1x1 treatment, advisees from 
the Alternative Advice treatment consistently do worse than the 1 x 1 treatment.  However, this 
difference is not especially large. 
    To determine whether these differences are significant, we ran regressions similar to 
those in Table 4.  The dataset combines data from the Alternative Advice treatment, data from 
the 1 x 1 treatment (pooled with self-advice data), and data from advisees in the Advice 
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treatment.  As with the regression reported in Table 4, this is a logit model with random effects 
nested at the session and individual levels and a control for the entry rate differential.  The base 
is the Alternative Advice treatment, so treatment effects are identified relative to this treatment 
for the same cycle.  Controls are included, by cycle, for the 1x1 and Alternative Advice 
treatments.  Table 8 reports the results of this exercise.  The first column reports parameters for 
the 1x1 treatment controls and the second column gives parameters for the advisee controls.  The 
estimated difference between the Alternative Advice and 1 x 1 treatments is positive (i.e. there is 
more strategic play in the 1 x 1 treatment), but only significant in the first cycle of inexperienced 
play.  That is, the Alternative Advice treatment does not improve advisees level of strategic play 
compared the 1-1 treatment where agents choose strictly on their own. This contrasts with the 
original advice treatment where advisees outperform the 1-1 treatment, significantly so at times.  
The differences between advisees from the Advice treatment and the Alternative Advice 
treatment are significant in all three cycles.  The original advice treatment, where advisors are 
playing the game and only receive a fraction of the advisees’ payoffs, leads to unambiguously 
more strategic play by advisees than the new advice treatment where advisors are not playing 
and receive the same payoff as advisees. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Underlying this difference in performance between the Advice and Alternative Advice 
treatments are differences in the advice sent.   There was no shortage of advice in the Alternative 
Advice treatment.  Every advisee received relevant advice (i.e. advice which related to how the 
game should be played) at least once, and they averaged 16.5 pieces of relevant advice.  Even 
accounting for the different number of periods, this is quite a bit more relevant advice than in the 
Advice treatment.  The problem is that the quality of this advice was poor.  In inexperienced 
subject sessions of the Advice treatment, 46% of advisees were told to play strategically as an 
ML at least once.  This figure drops to 27% in the Alternative Advice treatment even though they 
had 32 periods to receive advice as opposed to only 24 periods in an inexperienced subject 
session of the Advice treatment.   
Drilling deeper, we can get a sense of why advisors offered less useful advice in the 
Alternative Advice treatment.  In this treatment, advisees generally either received advice to play 
strategically starting in the first cycle of inexperienced play (21%) or never received it (73%).  
This differs from the original Advice treatment where inexperienced advisees were just as likely 
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to initially receive advice to play strategically in Cycle 2 (23%) as Cycle 1 (23%).  On a more 
qualitative level, while the frequency of offering advice changes little over time in the 
Alternative Advice treatment, the messages become terse repetitions of the same advice, 
suggesting little effort on the part of advisees.  In the original Advice treatment it is clear that the 
advisors learned to play strategically over time as they actually played the game, becoming 
increasingly likely to give good advice as a consequence.  In the Alternative Advice treatment 
advisors do not actually play the game and there is no increase in the number of advisors 
providing sound advice on strategic play.   One possible explanation for this difference is that 
advisors became disengaged, facing the same situation repeatedly without the ability to take any 
direct actions.   That is, even though advisors in the original Advice treatment had less incentive 
to give advice, and more things to do other than giving advice, having them play the game served 
the critical role of keeping them engaged in the task, continuing to learn to play strategically, and 
passing this on as a consequence. 
It’s been suggested that the results of our Alternative Advice contradict the work of 
Merlo and Schotter (1999, 2003) in which observers (who strictly observed in silence) performed 
better than the agents they were observing.  But in this case observers were told at the start of the 
session were told that what they were observing was relevant to a high stakes decision they 
would eventually make, which presumably focused their attention on the problem at hand.40  
This is consistent with the idea that having to make a decision, or anticipating having to make a 
decision, is a critical element in the good performance of observers. 
Finally, it is not clear that the poor quality of advice in the Alternative Advice treatment 
speaks to the value of advisors used by firms outside the lab.  Even though consultants do not 
typically make decisions for themselves, any tendency toward social loafing is likely disciplined 
by strong reputational reasons to remain engaged.41  We rather think the main takeaway is 
methodological.  In experimental economics we are taught the value of making treatments as 
parallel as possible, but sometimes this is not the case.  While there is obvious harm in having an 
                                                            
40 In these experiments subjects made a large number (75) of individual choices in an optimization task. Merlo and 
Schotter conjecture that the reason the original decision makers performed worse than the observers is that the small 
repeated payoffs in the initial treatment focused attention on the stimulus-aspect of the problem, preventing subjects 
from learning the tradeoffs involved in the question at hand.  The observers, not receiving any payoffs, did not get 
caught up in this. Our task is quite different, focusing on strategic reasoning rather than the ability to solve an 
optimization problem.   See Iyengar and Schotter (2008) for results related to those of Merlo and Schotter.   
41 Consultants are often hired for their prior expertise with the question at hand and learning is not an issue per se. 
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experimental design with a confound, in this case subject boredom may have overcome the 
benefits of parallelism.   
Conclusion 8:  The Alternative Advice treatment does nothing to change our conclusion that 
bilateral communication is a necessary ingredient for the strong performance of teams in the 
limit pricing game. 
VII. Summary and Discussion: The primary motivation for the present paper was to better 
understand how two person teams are able to meet and beat the truth wins (TW) benchmark for 
strategic play in a signaling game.  With this goal in mind we introduced two new treatments into 
the limit pricing game: (1) a self-advice treatment in which players were encouraged to express 
to write down their thoughts “regarding what was going on” and (2) an advisor-advisee treatment 
with one-way communications between advisors and their advisee.  The self-advice treatment 
had essentially no impact compared to individual subject play without self-advice.  While team 
play forces individuals to articulate their thought processes, this alone is not sufficient to 
generate a significant increase in strategic play.  The advisor-advisee relationship resulted in 
increased levels of strategic play for advisees compared to individuals, but fell well short of their 
(modified) TW benchmark.  This significant increase in the level of strategic play for advisees is 
consistent with the idea that two heads are better than one.  But the failure to meet the modified 
TW benchmark indicates a significant loss of information in the advisor-advisee relationship  
relative to two person teams acting jointly with continuous chat.  This implies that bilateral 
communication is a necessary condition for meeting and beating the TW benchmark, even 
though teams are susceptible to free riding and/or idle chatter that distracts from dealing with the 
problem at hand.  
The failure of advisees to meet the TW benchmark results from (i) advisors who act 
strategically but fail to pass the relevant advice and (ii) advisees who receive sound advice but 
fail to heed it.  Although the latter has been well documented in the psychology and economics 
literature on advice giving, the former has not been reported previously.  Looking at the team 
dialogues suggests one factor behind the failure to follow sound advice – when advisees do not 
understand the advice, one way communication prevents advisors from identifying and 
correcting any misunderstandings.    
The failure of advisors who play strategically to advise their partners to do so cannot be 
attributed to free riding given the incentive structure of the experiments, and cannot be explained 
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by hedging or the level of experience advisors had with strategic play.  Rather, gender 
differences were, to our surprise, playing a significant role.  Male advisors who played 
strategically consistently passed on relevant advice more often than female advisors. We believe 
this result is related to well established differences in confidence levels between men and women 
in a number of strategic situations (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).  Given the inevitable 
variation in confidence levels within the genders, this also implies that between subject 
differences in confidence levels account for much of the within gender variation in passing on 
advice.  An interesting avenue for future research is experiments that combine the advice 
treatment with direct elicitation of advisors’ confidence in their ability to play the game.  We 
conjecture that the gender effect will largely vanish once we control for differing levels of 
confidence. 
One particularly surprising feature of our data is that the positive impact of advice on 
strategic play is essentially independent of whether or not a sound explanation accompanies the 
advice to take a new, and improved, course of action.  This suggests that the main impact of 
advice is to simply get advisees to consider some new options.  This contradicts economists’ 
usual assumption that agents carefully consider all the options at their disposal prior to making 
their choices, and (in the spirit of models of rational inattention) indicates that learning models 
should not only account for learning over a fixed set of available options but should also allow 
for exploration of the set of available options where some are considered and abandoned while 
others are only evaluated when some external prompt is provided.   Experiments using 
techniques such as mouse-lab or eye-tracking would be helpful in directly confirming this.  
The relative success of freely interacting teams compared to advisees bears some important 
similarities to the difference between successful and unsuccessful consulting relationships in 
field settings: Client organizations perceive effective consulting as a two-way interaction with 
knowledge outflow from client to consultant influencing the quantity and quality of knowledge 
inflow from the consultant to the client organization (Todorova, 2004, Newell, 2005).  In this 
respect teams, with their two way interaction, strongly outperform “clients” in the advice 
treatment even though there are two heads to work with in both cases.  This may also have 
implications for successful discussions between different divisions within a hierarchal 
organization, particularly to the extent that lower ranked members might be constrained in their 
discussions and/or interactions with higher ranked members.   
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 Finally, it is worth discussing why teams are able to meet and beat the TW benchmark in 
this signaling game, but fail in other environments where there is a demonstrably correct 
answer.42  In this respect, the contrast with the takeover game (Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983) 
where teams typically fail to meet the TW benchmark (Casari, Zhang, and Jackson, 2014; 
Cooper and Sutter, 2015), is instructive.  In that environment, it is one thing to become aware of 
(either consciously or subconsciously) and respond to the adverse selection effect.  However, it is 
an entirely different thing to be able to calculate the precise response to this insight, which 
requires some training in statistics among other things.  In this case teams have little advantage 
over individuals, since teammates cannot communicate relevant insights that they don’t have.  In 
contrast, in our signaling game it’s clear relatively early on that the low cost monopolists want to 
distinguish themselves from the high cost types, and that choice of 5, 6 or 7 (particularly the 6 
and 7 with their negative payoff for high cost types) will do the trick; the insight is immediate 
and requires minimal computations regarding the tradeoff between sticking with 4 and choosing 
to limit price.  In this respect it will be interesting in future work to see how well teams perform 
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Table 1a: Monopolist Payoffs 
 
High Cost Monopolist (MH)  Low Cost Monopolist (ML) 
Monopolist 
Action 
Entrant’s Response  Monopolist 
Action 
Entrant’s Response 
IN OUT  IN OUT 
1 150 426  1 250 542 
2 168 444  2 276 568 
3 150 426  3 330 606 
4 132 408  4 352 628 
5 56 182  5 334 610 
6 -188 -38  6 316 592 
7 -292 -126  7 213 486 
 
 




Monopolist’s Type Expected 
Payoff High Cost Low Cost 
IN 500 200 350 
OUT 250 250 250 
 
Notes:  The highlighting of cells and payoffs is for expositional purposes – subjects’ payoff tables did not 





Table 2: Summary of Sessions 
 
 Inexperienced Experienced 
1 x 1 6 Sessions 82 Subjects 
5 Sessions 
66 Subjects 
2 x 2 (Team) 3 Sessions 64 Subjects 
3 Sessions 
60 Subjects 
Advisor/Advisee 9 Sessions 164 Subjects 
9 Sessions 
148 Subjects 




Notes:  In advisor/advisee sessions that were one subject short, an undergraduate RA played as the 
advisee so no subjects would need to be discarded.   
  
Table 3: Effect of Self Advice 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Inexperienced Cycle 2 2.380*** .398 
Experienced Cycle 1 4.173*** .868 
Experienced Cycle 2 6.258*** 1.007 
Experienced Cycle 3 7.099*** 1.005 
Experienced Cycle 4 8.853*** 1.177 
Self-advice * Inexperienced Cycle 1 .040 .944 
Self-advice * Inexperienced Cycle 2 -1.110 .891 
Self-advice * Experienced Cycle 1 -.812 .971 
Self-advice * Experienced Cycle 2 .315 1.096 
Self-advice * Experienced Cycle 3 -.482 1.149 
Self-advice * Experienced Cycle 4 -1.746 1.238 
Number of Subjects -.167 .203 
Entry Rate Differential 1.500* .808 
Log-likelihood -551.08 
 
Notes:  The regression is based on 1601 observations from 129 individuals in the 17 sessions of the 1x1 
and self-advice treatments, and includes random effects at the session and individual levels.  One (*), two 
(**), and three (***) stars indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.   
  
Table 4: Logit with Nested Random Effects: Treatment Effects on Strategic Play Over Time  
 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Inexperienced Cycle 2 1.582*** .313 
Experienced Cycle 1 3.094*** .567 
Experienced Cycle 2 5.243*** .671 
Experienced Cycle 3 5.649*** .713 
Experienced Cycle 4 6.706*** .766 
2x2 * Inexperienced Cycle 1 1.721** .757 
2x2 * Inexperienced Cycle 2 3.077*** .816 
2x2 * Experienced Cycle 1 2.603** 1.060 
2x2 * Experienced Cycle 2 Dropped, 100% Strategic Play 
2x2 * Experienced Cycle 3 Dropped, 100% Strategic Play 
Advisor * Inexperienced Cycle 1 .423 .602 
Advisor * Inexperienced Cycle 2 1.155** .571 
Advisor * Experienced Cycle 1 .638 .623 
Advisor * Experienced Cycle 2 -.779 .672 
Advisor * Experienced Cycle 3 -.870 .706 
Advisor * Experienced Cycle 4 -1.571** .748 
Advisee * Inexperienced Cycle 1 .630 .600 
Advisee * Inexperienced Cycle 2 2.158*** .579 
Advisee * Experienced Cycle 1 1.053* .631 
Advisee * Experienced Cycle 2 .385 .697 
Advisee * Experienced Cycle 3 .154 .736 
Advisee * Experienced Cycle 4 -.812 .773 
Number of Players -.003 .046 
Entry Rate Differential 2.105*** .538 
Log-likelihood -1472.52 
 
Notes:  The regression includes 3993 observations from 337 individuals/teams in 41 sessions, and 
includes random effects at the session and individual levels.  One (*), two (**), and three (***) stars 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.   
  
Table 5: Hazard Models, Giving Advice to Play Strategically 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 































% Strategic Play 
* Gender  
 -2.350*** 
(.661) 
Log-likelihood -368.77 -354.25 -349.15 
 
Notes:  All regressions include 158 observations from 120 advisors in 18 sessions.  Standard errors (reported in 
parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the advisor level.  One (*), two (**), and three (***) stars indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 6: Strategic Play as an ML as a Function of Type of Advice Received 
Inexperienced Subjects 
 
  Given Explanation for Strategic Play as an ML 
  No Yes 
Advised to Play 
Strategically as an ML 
No .425 (327) 
.500 
(10) 






  Given Explanation for Strategic Play as an ML 
  No Yes 
Advised to Play 
Strategically as an ML 
No .794 (277) 
N/A 
(0) 
Yes .812 (101) 
.951 
(226) 
   
  
Table 7: Logit with Nested Random Effects:  Effect of Receiving Advice 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Inexperienced Cycle 2 3.173*** .571 
Experienced Cycle 1 2.366** 1.237 
Experienced Cycle 2 3.973*** 1.324 
Experienced Cycle 3 3.966*** 1.357 
Experienced Cycle 4 4.459*** 1.405 
Inexperienced, Received Advice to Play Strategically 2.480** .972 
Inexperienced, Received Explanation for Strategic Play .019 1.201 
Inexperienced, Received Bad Advice -1.416** .660 
Experienced, Received Advice to Play Strategically 2.621* 1.403 
Experienced, Received Explanation for Strategic Play .294 1.536 
Experienced, Received Bad Advice .992 .842 
Number of Players -.124 .200 
Entry Rate Differential 5.012*** 1.549 
Log-likelihood -325.54 
 
Notes:  All regressions include fixed effects for the current cycle as well as random effects at the session and 
individual levels.  Models 1 and 2 include 1067 observations from 18 sessions and 124 advisees.  Model 3 includes 
1039 observations from 18 sessions and 121 advisees.  One (*), two (**), and three (***) stars indicate statistical 





Table 8: Probit, Treatment Effect of Alternative Advice Treatment 
Cycle Alt. Advice vs. 1x1 Alt. Advice vs. Advisees 
Inexperienced 1 -1.878 -2.198 (0.973)* (1.158)* 
Inexperienced 2 -1.048 -3.777 (0.908) (1.109)*** 
Experienced 1 -1.562 -2.814 (0.974) (1.104)** 


























Figure 2: 1x1 vs. Self-Advice
























































Figure 4: Strategic Play by MLs, Advisors vs. Advisees





















































































Figure 8: Alternative AdviceTreatment




This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  The National Science Foundation 
and other agencies have provided the funds for this research.  The instructions are simple.  If you 
follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you may make an appreciable amount of 
money.  These earnings will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. 
 
1. In this experiment you will be asked to make decisions in several periods.  There are 
two types of agents involved in each decision - “A” players and “B” players.  In each 
period each A player is paired with a B player.  Each A player makes a decision first.  
Then each B player makes a decision after seeing the decision of the A player with 
whom he is paired. 
 
2. A players: There are two types of A players – type 1 (A1) and type 2 (A2). 
 
Table 1 shows the payoffs for the A players.  You all have copies of payoff Table 1, 
please look at it now.  A’s payoffs depend on their type (whether they are an A1 or A2), 
the number they have chosen, and the actions of the B player they have been paired with 
for that period (whether the B player chooses X or Y).  Thus, for example, if an A1 
player were to choose 3, and the B player they were paired with chose X they would earn 
150, and if the B player chose Y they would earn 426.  Similarly, if an A2 chooses 3, and 
the B player they have been paired with chooses X they would earn 330, and if the B 
player chooses Y they would earn 606.  Notice that for each possible choice payoffs for 
A2’s are higher than the payoffs for A1s.  Also notice that for any choice payoffs are 
always higher for the A player if the B player they have been paired with chooses Y 
rather than X. 
 
A players have no choice over whether they are A1’s or A2’s.  A’s type will be 
determined randomly in each period through a process to be described shortly.  A’s will 
always know if they are an A1 or A2 for a given play of the game.  This will be clear 
from the payoff table on your computer screens.  
 
In each play of the game A players move first by choosing a number.  A1 players may 
choose any number between 1 and 7; A2 players may also choose any number between 1 
and 7. 
 
3. B players:  B players make their choices after seeing the number chosen by the A 
player they have been paired with for that period.  They do not know if the A player 
they have been paired with is an A1 or A2 type before they make their choice, they 
only get to see the number chosen by the A player they have been paired with. 
 
Table 2 shows the payoffs for the B player.  You all have copies of Table 2, please look 









Instructions for Advice Treatment
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For a B player if they know (or can guess correctly) that they are facing an A1 player, 
they earn more if they choose X than if they choose Y (500 versus 250).  On the other 
hand, if they know (or can guess correctly) that they are facing an A2 type, they earn 
more if they choose Y, than if they choose X (250 versus 200).  In cases where the B 
player is uncertain about the type of A player they have been paired with, the choice that 
maximizes earnings depends on your best estimate of the likelihood you are facing an A1 
versus an A2 player. 
 
After the B player has made her choice, payoffs for both A’s and B’s will be determined. 
 
4. In each period there is a 50% chance that the A player will be an A1 and a 50% 
chance they will be an A2.  In other words, in each period, on average, 1 out of 2 A 
players will be A1, while on average every 1 out of 2 A players will be an A2.  
However, which particular A players will be A1’s and which will be A2’s is 
determined randomly by the computer in each period. 
 
5.  In each period A and B players will be randomly matched with each other by the 
computer.  The random matching process is such that for each set of six (6) periods, 
each A player will be paired with each B player only once.  You will not know the 
identity of the other player you are matched with in any period. 
 
6. You will play as both an A player and as a B player.  Your designation as an A player 
or as a B player will stay the same for six (6) periods, and then you will switch roles 
for six (6) periods.  This process will repeat 2 times for a total of 24 periods. 
 
7. In each period you will be paired with another person.  Who you are paired with will 
remain the same throughout today’s session.  In each case one of you will be 
permitted to give advice to the other person. Who the advisor is and who the advisee 
is will remain the same throughout the session and has been determined randomly by 
the computer at the start of the session. Advisees are not permitted to send messages 
back to their advisors.  Only the advisers can send messages to their advisees. 
 
8. Advisers and advisees will always be the same player type: If the advisor is an A1 
player, their advisee will also be an A1 player. If the advisor is an A2 player their 
advisee will also be an A2 player. If the adviser is a B player their advisee will also 
be a B player.   
 
9. Advisors and advisees make their choices independently from each other, with 
advisees under no obligation to follow the advice they have been given.  Further, 
advisers and advisees will be playing against different subjects in each round of the 
game.  That is, if you are an A player and an adviser, the B player you are matched 
with is not the same B player you advisee is matched with. And if you are a B player 
and an adviser, the A player you are matched is different from the A player your 
advisee is matched with, although the type of A player you are matched with (A1 or 
A2) will be the same for both of you.  
 
 
Note, in sending messages to your advisee we request you follow two simple rules: 
(1) Be civil to your advisee and do not use any profanity and (2) Do not identify 
yourself.  The communication channel is intended for you to provide advice and 
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should be used that way.  We are employing this advisor/advisee procedure to see 
what, if any, impact it will have on how people behave in these kinds of situations.   
 
Before going any further, we want to make sure everyone knows how to read the payoff tables.  
So please answer the following questions.  If you have any trouble with the questions raise your 
hand and one of our monitors will be around to answer your question.  Our monitors will also be 
around to check your answers. 
 
1. Suppose you are an A2 player.  If you choose 4 and the B player you have been paired 
with chooses X your payoff will be ____________.  On the other hand, if you choose 5 and the B 
player chooses Y your payoff will be ________________. 
 
2. Suppose you are an A2 player.  If you choose 4 and the B player you have been paired 
with chooses Y your payoff will be _____________.  On the other hand, if you choose 5 and the 
B player you have been paired with chooses X your payoff will be ___________. 
 
3. Suppose you are an A1 player.  If you choose 2 and the B player you have been paired 
with chooses X your payoff will be __________.  On the other hand, if you choose 3 and the B 
player you have been paired with chooses Y your payoff will be _____________. 
 
4. Suppose you are an A1 player.  If you choose 2 and the B player you have been paired 
with chooses Y your payoff will be __________.  On the other hand, if you choose 3 and the B 
player you have been paired with chooses X then your payoff will be _________. 
 
5. Suppose you are a B player.  If you choose X and the A player is an A1 type you earn 
___________, while if it is an A2 type you earn ___________.  On the other hand, if you choose 
Y and the A player is an A2 type you earn ____________, while if it is A1 type you earn 
____________. 
 
6. Will As and Bs be matched with each other (randomly/the same) in each period? 
 
7. Suppose that you are an adviser and an A2 player, then you advisee will be a _____  
player.   
 
8. Suppose that you are an adviser and a B player, then your advisee will be a _______ 
player. 
 
9. Suppose that you are an adviser and a B player and are matched with an A1 player, then 
your advisee (will/will not necessarily) be matched with an A1 player.   
 
10. Suppose that you are an adviser and an A player, then whatever choice the B player you 
are matched with made (will/will not necessarily) be the same as the choice of the B player your 
advisee is matched with. 
 
11. As an adviser your advisee will always be the (same/different) person in each period. As 































2 168 444  276 568 2 
3 150 426  330 606 3 
4 132 408  352 628 4 
5 56 182  334 610 5 
6 -188 -38  316 592 6 












B's Choice A2 A1 
y 250 250 
x 200 500 
 
 
          
Advice Walk Through 
(These are read to subjects: material in bold is intended to remind experimenter of what needs to be done 
and not read to subjects.) 
 
Parameters for DR/explanation: 10 minutes for choices 
Remember to switch to 3 minutes for real play!!! (and 2 minutes after 12 periods of real play) 
To be read to subjects: not to be included with the written instructions.  
 
 We’re going to do a practice period before we play for cash.  The objective here is to familiarize 
you with your computer screen and the procedures.  To get started we much first log in.  We will come 
around to do this.  When your screen comes on don’t do anything until I tell you to.  
 
OK – everyone have a screen now?   
 
Just look at it – Don’t do anything just yet until I tell you to. I need to explain your screen layouts first 
and walk you through a practice period before we play for cash. 
 
You will know if you are an A or a B player by the payoff table on your screen – if it matches the A 
player’s payoffs on your hard copy you’re an A. If it matches the B player’s payoffs you’re a B.  It will 
also indicate if you are an A or B at the top of your screen above the payoff table.  And if you are an A – 
whether you are an A1 or an A2 type.  Remember that as an adviser whatever type you are for this period 
you advisee will be the same type this period as well. 
 
Put slides up here 
 
One thing to note here, if you are an A2 player, on your computer screen your payoffs will be listed 
before the A1 player’s payoffs.  Other than that everything is as on the payoff tables we handed out.  
 
Next, notice that there is a dialogue box in the lower right hand corner of your screen.  If you are the 
adviser the lower part of the box will be black which you can click onto to type a message to your 
advisee. (Only you and your advisee can see your messages, no other subjects can see them.) To send a 
message hit the enter key.  Your messages will be reported at the top of the dialogue box.  If you are an 
advisee the lower part of the dialogue box will be white and it will not be possible to type a message 
there.  All you can do is get messages form your advisor.  Advisors please send a message to your 
advisees now.  “Hello, how are you” will do fine.  Remember you must hit the enter key to send the 
message.   
 
OK – have all the advisors sent a message and advisees seen their advisors message? 
 
11. In each period the A players must choose first.  To start you will have 3 minutes to make 
your choices.   
 
On the right hand side of the payoff table will be a column titled “my choice” (this is in blue).  Do 
you all see this? 
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You use your mouse to click on your choice under the “my choice” column. Possible payoffs for 
this choice will be highlighted in red.   
 
You must confirm your choice. To do this click on the little box at the top of your screen which 
says Send choice (in red).  You have to click this box to send your choice. 
 
Since we need to keep the session moving, if no choice has been made after the 3 minutes is up 
you will be prompted to make one. Also at that time advisers will no longer be permitted to send 
messages to their advisees. 
 
Note you do not have to use all the time allotted before making your choice and should not plan 
to do so unless it is necessary (as choices cannot go forward until all A players have made their 
choices). 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
A player advisers please feel free to start giving advice and to make your choices now.  
Remember you have to click on the number you want under the my choice column and then click on 
the send choice box at the top of the screen to send your choice.  Remember, advisers and advisees 
choose independently of each other. 
 
 
Can start reading this while A players are choosing -  
 
12. Once all the A players have made their choices, each B player will see the A player’s choice, 
for the A player they have been paired with for this period.  The number chosen is located 
just above the dialogue box (in pink). It will read “A player’s choice is xxx”. Please don’t do 
anything just yet. 
 
 
The B player must now choose between X and Y.   
 
You also have 3 minutes to make your choices.  Since we need to keep the session moving, if no 
choice has been made after the 3 minutes is up you will be prompted to make one. Also at that 
time advisers will no longer be permitted to send messages to their advisees.  As with the A 
players your choices become binding once you have clicked on the send box.   
 
 Are there any questions? 
 
B player advisers please feel free to start giving advise and to make your choices now.  Please 
note that you do not have to use all the time allotted before making your choice and should not plan to 
do so unless it is necessary. Remember you have to click on the letter you want (X or Y) under the 
my choice column and then click on the send choice box at the top of the screen to send your choice.  
Remember, advisers and advisees choose independently of each other. 
 
Note that A player advisers can continue e-mailing while the B players are choosing.  And B 
player advisers can continue e-mailing while the A players are choosing. 
 
.   
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13.  After both players have made their choices the computer will highlight each player’s 
actual payoff for the period (in red), and display the A player’s type, and both players’ 
choices in the space below the countdown clock.  Please have a look at this information and 
record it on your Subject Record Sheets. 
 
In addition, the decisions of all pairs in the current period will be shown on the left, bottom 
part of your screen.  You will see each A players’ type, the number chosen, and whether the 
B player they were paired with chose X or Y.  Note, that pairs have been ordered by the 
number A players have chosen, going from highest to lowest. There is space on your screens 
to display these choices for the last three (3) periods, with choices for the just completed 
period reported at the bottom of the display, the previous period just above it, and the period 
before that at the top of the display.  You can also use the scroll bar to look back at earlier 
periods.  Note if no choice has been made, and your choice time has run out, this scroll bar 
will become inoperative, as it is time to make your choice.  
 
This information is provided automatically after each period except for the period preceding 
the changeover from A to B players and vice versa.  So you will not see this information until 
after I reset the parameters for the next period. 
 
Put another slide up here. 
 
13. The payoff tables are in francs.  Francs will be converted into dollars at the rate of 1 frank = 
.0025 dollars.  In addition, advisors will receive a bonus equal to 30% of the earnings of the 
person they are advising.  (Note – this is not a subtraction form the advisees earnings – just an 
extra payment to provide incentives to advisers to give the best advice they can.)  At the end 
of the experiment, you will be paid the sum of your earnings for all periods. This will be paid 
to you in cash along with the $5 participation fee.  FEEL FREE TO MAKE AS MUCH 











1. Your role as an A or B player will switch every ______ periods.   
 
2.  In each period each A player is paired with a DIFFERENT B player (and vice versa).  In fact, the 
rotation rule is set up so that you will only play with the same person at most once (or twice) (and 
in random order) in each set of _______ periods. 
 
3. For A players, in each period there is a 50% chance you will be an A1 type and a 50% chance you 
will be an A2 type.  Thus, in each period there is a 50% chance the B player will be facing an A1 
player and a 50% chance of facing an A2 player.  Note, we use a block random design so that 
with an even number (ex 6) of A players half (3) will always be A1 and half (3) will always be 
A2. [With an odd number (ex 5) of A players (2) will always be A1 and (2) will always be A2 
with the computer “flipping a coin” to determine what the 5th players type will be].  However, 
which A player is an A1 and which an A2 is determined randomly within each period. 
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4. You have 3 minutes to start with to make your choices.  You do not have to use all this time.  
Once everyone has made their choice, we move onto the next stage so if you do not need the full 
time, don’t use it. 
 
5. Information to the left of your screen shows what each A player has chosen, the B players 
response and the A players type.  Responses for the latest period are reported at the bottom, for 
the previous period just above that, and so forth.  The little number to the right of this listing is 





Are there any questions? 
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